NOTE ON THE TRANSLATION OF CHINESE TERMS

In my books, I have opted for translating all Chinese medical terms with the exception of “Yin”, “Yang”, “Qi” and “cun” (unit of measurement).

I also continued to use initial capitals for the terms which are specific to Chinese medicine. For example, “Blood” indicates one of the vital substances of Chinese medicine, whereas “blood” denotes the liquid flowing in the blood vessels; e.g. “In Blood deficiency the menstrual blood may be pale”. I use initial capitals also for all pulse qualities and for pathological colours and shapes of the tongue body.

This system has served readers of my books well. As most teachers (including myself) use Chinese terms when lecturing (e.g. Yuan Qi rather than “Original Qi”), I have given each term in pinyin whenever it is introduced for the first time. One change I have introduced recently (as in the second edition of “Foundations of Chinese Medicine”) is to use the pinyin terms more often throughout the text and at least once in each chapter when the Chinese term is first introduced. I have done this to reduce the frequency with which the reader may need to consult the Glossary.

I made the choice of translating all Chinese terms (with the exceptions indicated above) mostly for reasons of style: I believe that a well-written English text reads better than one peppered with Chinese terms in pinyin. Leaving Chinese terms in pinyin is probably the easiest option but this is not ideal also because a single pinyin word can often have more than one meaning; for example, jing can mean “channels”, “periods”, “Essence” or “shock”, while shen can mean “Kidneys”, “Mind” or “Spirit”.

I am conscious of the fact that there is no such thing as a “right” translation of a Chinese medicine term and my terminology is not proposed in this spirit; in fact, Chinese medicine terms are essentially impossible to translate. The greatest difficulty in
translating Chinese terms is probably that a term has many facets and different meanings in different contexts: thus it would be impossible for one translation to be “right” in every situation and every context. For example, the term jue (厥) has many different meanings; a translation can illustrate only one aspect of a multi-faceted term. In fact, jue can mean a state of collapse with unconsciousness; coldness of hands and feet; or a critical situation of retention of urine. In other contexts it has other meanings: e.g. jue qi (厥气), a condition of chaotic Qi; jue xin tong (厥心痛), a condition of violent chest pain with cold hands; and jue yin zheng (厥证), the Terminal-Yin pattern within the Six-Stage Identification of Patterns characterized by Heat above and Cold below.

Many sinologists concur that Chinese philosophical terms are essentially impossible to translate and that, the moment we translate them, we distort them with a world-view that is not Chinese. Ames is particularly clear about the intrinsic distortion of Chinese concepts when they are translated. He gives examples of Chinese terms that are distorted when translated, such as Tian (Heaven), You-Wu (Being” and “Non-Being”), Dao (Way”), Xing (human nature”), Ren (benevolence”), Li (Principle”), Qi (primal substance”), etc.  

Ames is particularly forceful in rejecting a single, one-to-one translation of a Chinese term into a Western one in the introduction of his book “Focusing the Familiar” (a translation of the Confucian text Zhong Yong).  

Ames says: “Our Western languages are substance-oriented and are therefore most relevant to the descriptions of a world defined by discreteness, objectivity and permanence. Such languages are ill disposed to describe and interpret a world, such as that of the Chinese, that is primarily
characterized by continuity, process and becoming.”

Ames then gives some examples of what he considers to be serious mis-translations of Chinese philosophical terms. The important thing is that these are not “mis-translations” because the terms are “wrong” but because of the intrinsic difference between Chinese and Western thinking and therefore the inherent inability of Western terms to convey Chinese philosophical ideas. Ames says: “For example, ‘You’ 有 and ‘Wu’ 无 have often been uncritically rendered as “Being” and “Non-Being.”

Influential translators, until quite recently, have rendered ‘wu xing’ 五行 as ‘Five Elements’. ‘Xing’ 性 is still most often translated as ‘nature’. All these translations promote the fixed and univocal characterizations of objects or essences emergent from a language rooted in a substantialist perspective [our Western languages].”

Ames stresses that the use of a “substances language” (i.e. a Western language) to translate Chinese insights into a world of process and change has led to seriously inappropriate interpretations of the Chinese sensibility. Ames asserts that it is the very difference between Chinese and Western philosophy that makes translation of Chinese terms virtually impossible. He says: “In the classical traditions of the West, being takes precedence over becoming and thus becoming is ultimately unreal. Whatever becomes is realized by achieving its end – that is, coming into being. In the Chinese world, becoming takes precedence over being. ‘Being’ is interpreted as a transitory state marked by further transition.”

Ames then says: “The Chinese world is a phenomenal world of continuity, becoming and change. In such a world there is no final discreteness. Things cannot be understood as objects. Without this notion of objectivity, there can only be the flux of
passing circumstances in which things dissolve into the flux and flow. A processive language precludes the assumption that objects serve as references of linguistic expressions. The precise referential language of denotation and description is to be replaced by a language of ‘deference’ in which meanings both allude to and defer to one another in a shifting field of significance. A referential language [Western language] characterizes an event, object, or state of affairs through an act of naming meant to indicate a particular thing. On the other hand, the language of deference [Chinese] does not employ proper names simply as indicators of particular individuals or things, but invokes hints, suggestions, or allusions to indicate foci in a field of meanings."\(^6\)

As an example of this intrinsic impossibility of translating a Chinese philosophical term into a Western language, Ames then cites Steve Owen’s reluctance in translating shì 诗 as “poem”. Owen says: “If we translate ‘shi’ as ‘poem’, it is merely for the sake of convenience. ‘Shi’ is not a ‘poem’: ‘shi’ is not a thing made in the same way one makes a bed, a painting or a shoe. A ‘shi’ can be worked on, polished and crafted; but that has nothing to do with what a ‘shi’ fundamentally ‘is’… ‘Shi’ is not the ‘object’ of its writer: it is the writer, the outside of an inside.”\(^7\)

Ames gives various translations of Li (a Confucian concept) as an example of how a multiplicity of terms may apply to a single Chinese term and how none of them is “wrong”. He says that Li have been variously translated as “ritual”, “rites”, “customs”, “etiquette”, “propriety”, “morals”, “rules of proper behaviour” and “worship”. Ames says: “Properly contextualized, each of these English terms can render li on occasion. In classical Chinese, however, the character carries all of these meanings on every occasion of its use.”\(^8\) This confirms clearly how, by the very translation, we limit a Chinese term that is rich with multiple meanings to a single meaning in Chinese.
Ames says that in classical Chinese philosophical texts, allusive and connotatively rich language is more highly prized than clarity, precision and argumentative rigor. This rather dramatic contrast between Chinese and Western languages with respect to the issue of clarity presents the translator of Chinese philosophical texts with a peculiar burden.

For the Chinese, the opposite of clarity is not confusion, but something like vagueness. Vague ideas are really determinable in the sense that a variety of meanings are associated with them. Each Chinese term constitutes a field of meanings which may be focused by any of a number of its meanings. Ames says that in the translation of Chinese texts we must avoid what Whitehead called “the Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary”. By this, he means the assumption that there exists a complete semantic repository of terms of which we may adequately characterize the variety and depth of our experience and that, ideally, one may seek a one-to-one correspondence between word and meaning.

With this “fallacy” in mind, Ames and Hall say: “We challenge the wisdom and accuracy of proposing ‘one-to-one’ equivalencies in translating terms from one language to another. We introduce the notion of ‘linguistic clustering’ as an alternative strategy to ‘literal translation’ that allows us to put the semantic value of a term first by parsing [describe grammatically] its range of meaning according to context, with the assumption that a range of meaning with a different configuration of emphasis is present on each appearance of the term.”

These ideas could not be more apt to illustrate the problems in translating Chinese medicine terms. Of course we must strive for precision and consistency but to think that there is a one-to-one, “right” correspondence between a Chinese medicine idea and a
Western term is a misunderstanding of the very essence of Chinese medicine.

For example, to say that the only “right” translation of *Chong Mai* is “Thoroughfare Vessel” makes us fall into the trap of what Whitehead calls the “Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary”. Of course, *Chong Mai* can be translated as “Thoroughfare Vessel” but that is only one of its meanings and it is absolutely impossible for a single Western term to convey the richness of ideas behind the word *Chong Mai* (which I translate as “Penetrating Vessel”): to think that we can reduce a rich Chinese medicine idea to a single, one-to-one term in a Western language reveals, in my opinion, a misunderstanding of the very essence of Chinese medicine.

Ames makes this point very forcefully. He says: “*The Fallacy of the Perfect Dictionary is largely a consequence of our analytical bias towards univocity. We would suggest that this bias does not serve us well when approaching Chinese texts. Not only is there the continued possibility of novel experiences requiring appeal to novel terminologies, but also there is seldom, if ever, a simple, one-to-one translation of Chinese terms into Western languages. The allusiveness of the classical Chinese language is hardly conducive to univocal translations. We would contend that, in translating Chinese texts into Western languages, it is most unproductive to seek a single equivalent for a Chinese character. In fact, rather than trying to avoid ambiguity by a dogged use of formally stipulated terms, the translator might have to concede that characters often require a cluster of words to do justice to their range of meanings – all of which are suggested in any given rendering of the character. In fact, any attempt to employ univocal translations of Chinese terms justified by appeal to the criteria of clarity or univocity often reduces philosophical insight to nonsense and poetry to doggerel. Such an approach to translation serves only to numb Western readers to the
provocative significance harboured within the richly vague and allusive language of the Chinese texts.”

As an example of the multiplicity of meanings of a Chinese term and therefore of the fact that it is perfectly legitimate to translate a single Chinese idea into more than one term according to different contexts, Ames says that he translates the term zhong (“centre” or “central”) in the title of the Confucian text sometimes as “focus”, sometimes as “focusing” and other times as “equilibrium”. Other times, he even translates it as “centre” or “impartiality”. He says strongly: “The Chinese language is not logocentric. Words do not name essences. Rather, they indicate always-transitory processes and events. It is important therefore to stress the gerundative character of the language. The language of process is vague, allusive and suggestive.”

According to Ames, in the field of philosophy, two terms particularly stand out as being influenced by a Western thinking when translated, i.e. Tian (“Heaven”) and Ren (“benevolence”). Ames says: “When we translate Tian as ‘Heaven’, like it or not, we invoke in the Western reader a notion of transcendent creator Deity, along with the language of soul, sin and afterlife...When we translate Ren as “benevolence”, we psychologize and make altruistic a term which originally had a radically different range of sociological connotations. Being altruistic for example, implies being selfless in the service of others. But this “self-sacrifice” implicitly entails a notion of “self” which exists independently of others and that can be surrendered – a notion of self which we believe is alien to the world of the Analects [of Confucius]: indeed, such a reading [of the term “ren”] transforms what is fundamentally a strategy for self-realization into one of self-abnegation.”

With regard to Chinese medicine, the term Xue 血 (“Blood”) is a good example
of the above-mentioned problem reported by Ames. When we translate the word Xue as “Blood” we immediately alter its essential character and give it a Western medical connotation; in fact, in Chinese medicine, Xue is itself actually a form of Qi and one that is closely bound with Nutritive Qi (Ying Qi). Indeed, the term mai 脉 appearing in the “Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine” is often ambiguous as it sometimes clearly refers to the acupuncture channels and other times to the blood vessels.

After highlighting the problems in translating Chinese terms, Ames confirms that a single Chinese term may have different meaning in different contexts. For example, the term shen 神 in some cases means “human spirituality”, in others it means “divinity”. As he considers only the philosophical meanings of the word shen, we could actually add many others in the context of Chinese medicine, e.g. “mind”, “spirit”, “lustre” (in the context of diagnosis).

Graham says: “Every Western sinologist knows that there is no exact equivalent in his own language for such a word as ren 仁 or de 德, and that as long as he thinks of it as synonymous with “benevolence” or “virtue” he will impose Western preconceptions on the thought he is studying.”

Ames then surveys the options that are presented to a translator and seems to favour simply transliterating the Chinese terms and leave them untranslated. He says: “To some, this approach may appear to be simply the laziest way out of a difficult problem. But “ritual” has a narrowly circumscribed set of meanings in English, and Li an importantly different and less circumscribed set. Just as no Indological scholar would look for English equivalent for ‘karma’, ‘dharma’ and so on, perhaps it is time to do the same for classical Chinese, the homonymity of the language notwithstanding.”
Hall confirms that a single Chinese term may have a plurality of meanings. He says: “*The Chinese have traditionally affirmed as the ground of their intellectual and institutional harmony the recognition of the co-presence of a plurality of significances with which any given term might easily resonate.*”\(^\text{16}\)

Finally, another sinologist, Yung Sik Kim, discusses the difficulty presented by the plurality of meanings of a single Chinese term. He says: “*I have adopted the policy of sticking to one English translation for a particular Chinese word whenever possible... Of course, exceptions cannot be avoided altogether. I have had to resort to different translations for such characters as ‘xin’ 心 which means both ‘heart’ and ‘mind’; ‘tian’ 天, both ‘heaven’ and ‘sky’.*”\(^\text{17}\)

In another passage, Yung Sik Kim affirms that transliteration of a Chinese term with a plurality of meanings is the only alternative: “*The term ‘li’ 理 is difficult to define. It is difficult even to translate because there is no single word in Western languages that covers all facets of what ‘li’ meant to the traditional Chinese mind. The existence of many translations for the term, which often leaves transliteration as the only viable option, bespeaks the difficulty.*”\(^\text{18}\)

Although a diversity of translation of Chinese terms may present its problems, these are easily overcome if an author explains the translation in a glossary and, most importantly, explains the meaning of a given Chinese term in its context (in our case, Chinese medicine).

In my books, I have chosen to translate all Chinese medicine terms rather than using *pinyin* purely for reasons of style as a sentence written half in English and half in *pinyin* is often awkward. Moreover, if we use *pinyin* terms in writing, it could be argued that
we should be consistent and use *pinyin* terms for all Chinese medicine terms and this
would not make for very clear reading. Consider the following sentence: “To treat
*Pi-Yang Xu* we adopt the *zhi fa* of *bu pi* and *wen Yang*” (“To treat Spleen-Yang
deficiency we adopt the treatment principle of tonifying the Spleen and warming
Yang”).

Moreover, the problem arises only in the written form as, in my experience, most
lecturers in colleges throughout the Western world normally prefer using *pinyin* terms
rather than their counterparts in English (or any other Western languages). Thus, a
lecturer will refer to Kidney-*Jing* rather than “Kidney-Essence”. Indeed, when I myself
lecture, I generally use the *pinyin* terms rather than their English translation. Again,
most lecturers use a pragmatic approach translating some terms into English (such as
“treatment principle” instead of “*zhi fa*”) and leaving others in *pinyin* such as “*Yuan Qi*”
or “*Chong Mai*”.

When I lecture I always try to give the participants an idea of the meaning of a
particular Chinese character and its significance and application in Chinese medicine.
Indeed, the use of *pinyin* when lecturing renders Chinese medicine truly international as
I can lecture in the Czech Republic and mention *Jing, Yang Qiao Mai, Wei Qi*, etc.,
knowing that I will be understood by everyone.

A diversity of translation of Chinese terms may even have a positive aspect as each
author may highlight a particular facet of a Chinese term so that diversity actually
enriches our understanding of Chinese medicine. If someone translates *Zong Qi* (宗气) as
“Initial Qi”, for example, we learn something about that author’s view and
understanding of *Zong Qi*; the translation cannot be branded as “wrong” (I translate this
term as “Gathering Qi”). Another example: if someone translates *yang qiao mai* as
“Yang Motility Vessel”, the translation captures one aspect of this vessel’s nature; again, this could not be defined as wrong (I translate the name of this vessel as “Yang Stepping Vessel”).

Trying to impose a standard, “right” translation of Chinese medicine terms may lead to suppression of healthy debate; I therefore hope that readers will continue to benefit from the diversity of translation of Chinese medical terms and draw inspiration from the rich heritage of Chinese medicine that it represents.

I firmly believe that the future lies not in trying to establish a rigid, embalmed, fossilized, “right” terminology based on single, one-to-one translations of Chinese ideas. Indeed, I believe this is a potentially dangerous trend as it would, in my opinion, lead students and practitioners away from the richness of Chinese language and richness of meanings of Chinese medicine ideas. The adoption of a standardized, “approved” terminology of Chinese medical terms may indeed, in time, divorce students and practitioners from the essence of Chinese medicine. If an “official”, standardized translation of Chinese terms took hold, then students would be less inclined to study the Chinese terms to explore their meaning.

Ames and Hall make the same point: “Such translations have been ‘legitimized’ by their gradual insinuation into the standard Chinese-English dictionaries and glosses. By encouraging the uncritical assumption in those who consult these reference works that this formula of translations provides the student with a ‘literal’ rendering of the terms, these lexicons have become complicit in an entrenched cultural equivocation that we strive to avoid.”

They then further make the point that using a one-to-one translation of Chinese terms
ignores the cultural background where they came from: “Our argument is that it is in fact these formulaic usages that are radical interpretations. To our mind, to consciously or unconsciously transplant a text from its own historical and intellectual soil and replant it in one that has decidedly different philosophical landscape is to take liberties with the text and is radical in the sense it tampers with its very roots.”

As I said above, an “official”, standardized translation of Chinese terms may make students and practitioners less inclined to study the Chinese terms to explore their meaning with their own interpretation. Ames and Hall say: “Our goal is not to replace one inadequate formula with another. Our translations are intended as no more than suggestive ‘placeholders’ that refer readers back to this glossary to negotiate their own meaning, and, we hope, to appropriate the Chinese terms for themselves.”

Moreover, imposing an “approved” terminology in English betrays an Anglo-centric world view: to be consistent, we should then have an “approved” terminology in every major language of the world. It seems to me much better to try and understand the spirit and the essence of Chinese medicine by studying its characters and their clinical significance and using pinyin transliteration whenever appropriate.

Trying to fossilize Chinese medicine terms into an imposed terminology goes against the very essence of the Chinese language which, as Ames says, is not logocentric and in which words do not name essences: rather, they indicate always-transitory processes and events. The language of process is vague, allusive and suggestive.

Because Chinese language is a language of process, the question arises also whether practising Chinese medicine actually helps the understanding of Chinese medical terminology: in my opinion, in many cases it does. For example, I feel that clinical
experience helps us to understand the nature of the Chong Mai (Penetrating Vessel) and therefore helps us to understand the term Chong in a “knowing practice” way (as Farquhar defines it)\(^{22}\) rather than a theoretical way.

Of course, a translator of Chinese books should strive for precision and consistency, but we must accept that there is a rich multiplicity of meanings for any give idea of Chinese medicine. The Chong Mai is a good example of this multiplicity as the term chong could be translated as “thoroughfare”, “strategic cross-roads”, “to penetrate”, “to rush”, “to rush upwards”, “to charge”, “activity”, “movement” and “free passage”. Which of these translations is “correct”? They are all correct as they all convey an idea of the nature and function of the Chong Mai.

I therefore think that the future of teaching Chinese medicine lies not in trying to impose the straight-jacket of a rigid terminology of the rich ideas of Chinese medicine, but in teaching students more and more Chinese characters explaining the richness of meanings associated with them in the context of Chinese medicine. I myself, would not like my own terminology to be “adopted” as the “correct” or “official” one: I would rather see colleges teaching more and more Chinese to their students by illustrating the rich meanings of Chinese medicine terms. As mentioned above, my main motive for translating all terms is purely for reasons of style in an English-language textbook; when I lecture I generally use pinyin terms but, most of all, I show the students the Chinese characters and try to convey their meaning in the context of Chinese medicine.

Finally, I would like to explain my continued translation of Wu Xing as “Five Elements”. The term “Five Elements” has been used by most Western practitioners of Chinese Medicine for a long time (also in French and other European languages). Some authors consider this to be a misunderstanding of the meaning of the Chinese term “Wu
“Xing”, perpetuated over the years. “Wu” means “five” and “Xing” means “movement”, “process”, “to go”, “conduct” or “behaviour”. Most authors therefore think that the word “Xing” cannot indicate “element” as a basic constituent of Nature, as was supposedly intended in ancient Greek philosophy.

This is, in my opinion, only partly true as the elements, as they were conceived by various Greek philosophers over the centuries, were not always considered “basic constituents” of Nature or “passive motionless fundamental substances”. Some Greek philosophers conceived the elements as dynamic qualities of Nature, in a way similar to Chinese philosophy.

For example, Aristotle gave a definite dynamic interpretation to the four elements and called them “primary form” (prota somata). He said: “Earth and Fire are opposites also due to the opposition of the respective qualities with which they are revealed to our senses: Fire is hot, Earth is cold. Besides the fundamental opposition of hot and cold, there is another one, i.e. that of dry and wet: hence the four possible combinations of hot-dry [Fire], hot-wet [Air], cold-dry [Earth] and cold-wet [Water] . . . the elements can mix with each other and can even transform into one another . . . thus Earth, which is cold and dry, can generate Water if wetness replaces dryness.”

To Aristotle, therefore, the four elements became the four basic qualities of natural phenomena, classified as combinations of four qualities, hot, cold, dry and wet. As is apparent from the above statement, the Aristotelian elements could even transform into one another and generate each other.

This interpretation is very similar to the Chinese one, in which the elements are qualities of Nature. Furthermore, it is interesting to note the similarity with the Chinese theory of Yin-Yang: the four Aristotelian elements derive from the interaction of the basic Yin-Yang qualities of cold-hot and dry-wet.

Thus, it is not entirely true to say that the Greek elements were conceived only as the basic constituents of matter, the “building blocks” of Nature which would make the
use of the word “element” wrong to indicate *xing*. Furthermore, the word “elements” does not necessarily imply that: it does so only in its modern chemical interpretation. In conclusion, for the above reasons I have kept the word “element” as a translation of the Chinese word “*xing*. According to Wang, the term “Five Elements” could be translate in a number of ways, e.g. “agents”, “entities”, “goings’, “conduct”, “doings”, “forces”, “activites”, and “stages of change”.25

Recently, the term “Five Phases” is gaining acceptance but some sinologists disagree with this translation and propose returning to ‘Five Elements”. Friedrich and Lackner, for example, suggest restoring the term “elements”.26 Graham uses the term “Five Processes”.27 I would probably agree that “processes” is the best translation of Wu Xing. In fact, the book “Shang Shu” written during the Western Zhou dynasty (1000-771 BC) said: “The Five Elements are Water, Fire, Wood, Metal and Earth. Water moistens downwards; Fire flares upwards; Wood can be bent and straightened; Metal can be moulded and can harden; Earth allows sowing, growing and reaping.”28

Some sinologists (e.g. Needham and Fung Yu Lan) still use the term “element”. Fung Yu Lan suggests that a possible translation of *wu xing* could be “Five Activities” or “Five Agents”.29 Although the term “five phases” has gained some acceptance as a translation of “*wu xing*”, I find this term restrictive as it clearly refers to only one aspect of the Five Elements, i.e. phases of a (seasonal) cycle.

A glossary with *pinyin* terms, Chinese characters and English translation appears in the glossaries of my books. I include both a *Pinyin*-English and an English-*Pinyin* glossary.

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1 Ames R T, Rosemont H 1998 The Analects of Confucius – a Philosophical Translation, Ballantine
Publishing Group, New York, p. 311.
2 Ames R T and Hall D L 2001 Focusing the Familiar – A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhong Yong, University of Hawai‘i Press, Honolulu, pp. 6 to 16.
3 Ibid., p. 6.
4 Ibid., p. 6.
5 Ibid., p. 10.
6 Ibid., p. 10.
7 Ibid., p. 13.
8 Ames R T and Hall D L 2001 Focusing the Familiar - A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong, University of Hawai‘i Press, Honolulu, p. 69.
10 Ibid., p. 16.
11 Ibid., p. 16.
13 Ibid., p. 313.
16 Thinking from the Han, p. 4.
17 Yung Sik Kim 2000 The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi, American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, p. 11.
18 Ibid., p. 19.
20 Ibid., p. 55-6.
21 Ibid., p. 56.
24 Lamanna E P 1967 Storia della Filosofia (History of Philosophy), vol 1, Le Monnier, Florence, p 220–221.
28 Shang Shu (c 659 BC) cited in 1975 Practical Chinese Medicine (Shi Yong Zhong Yi Xue 实用 中医 学), Beijing Publishing House, Beijing, p. 32. The book Shang Shu is placed by some in the early Zhou dynasty (hence c. 1000 BC), but the prevalent opinion is that is was written sometime between 659 BC and 627 BC.